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Romania’s participation in World War II was brought about by political reasons 
and strategic needs that resulted from the international political situation at the 
middle of the twentieth century. The loss of approximately one third of the national 
territory and of six million inhabitants to the three neighbouring countries (that is the 
Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria) basically accounted for Romania’s taking part 
in military operations on both the East and the West front during World War II1. 
One can hardly say that Romania did not do its best to avoid becoming involved 
in the war. From September 1939 to June 1941, the foreign policy laid focus on non-
belligerency and neutrality2. But eventually Romania was drawn in, too, right after 
the series of unfortunate events in the summer of 19403, so that on the 22nd of June 
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1941, Romanian troops were crossing the Prut as ordered by the head of the state at 
the time, General Ion Antonescu1. 
As far as the requirements of waging a modern war are concerned, Romania was 
taken aback by the outbreak of the war. Romanian effective forces, though in large 
number2, lacked in modern equipment and war techniques that such a conflagration 
asks for3.  
The wall of fire and steel which the leaders of the time spoke of in order to 
reassure people and public opinion turned out to be a bluff made up by the for the 
sake of propaganda by the authoritarian monarchic regime. Within few weeks, 
Romanian frontiers would collapse under the pressure of the most important political 
and military forces of the time that is Hitlerite Germany and the Soviet Union, 
dragging along Carol II’s regime.  
The new head of the state, Ion Antonescu, would start at once reconstructing the 
army, as he was well aware that ongoing international political events could provide 
Romania with an opportunity to make its borders stand again and to reintegrate all 
territories that had been temporarily under foreign rule. Antonescu was to join forces 
with the Axis and wage war against the Soviet Union, as strongly believed that the 
Axis stood a firm chance of winning the war4. 
The military campaign led by the Romanian army on the East front had as an 
objective to set free Basarabia and the North of Bucovina, territories which had been 
torn apart by the Soviet Union as a result of the ultimatum delivered in June 19405. 
It is also true that Ion Antonescu was hoping that an estimation of Romania’s siding 
with Germany could bring along the retrocession of Ardeal; that was the very same 
reason for which Hungary also sent troops to the East front and declared war to the 
Soviet Union6. 
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Owing to the alliance with Germany, the two provinces were set free in July, not 
without major human sacrifice1, and political controversy whether or not war against 
the Soviets should be waged beyond the Nistru soon broke out between political 
opposition, represented by the historical parties, and marshal Antonescu’s 
government. It stands to reason that the head of the state had the last say in this 
matter and that Romanian soldiers would go and fight in the wilderness of Russia. 
They fought courageously besides German allies who would often show gratitude 
for their support and sacrifice. 
Three times were the Romanian and German troops defeated, in Stalingrad, in 
Crimea and on the Moldavian front Iaşi - Chişinău, and the defeats meant military 
disaster as they put an end to the Romanian campaign on the East front. The 
campaign had taken three years and two months (the 22nd of June 1941 – the 23rd of 
August 1944). The defeat of the Romanian army on the front in Moldova during the 
Soviet offensive Iaşi – Chişinău, together with the effects of the blow at the palace 
and the arresting of the marshal and his people would eventually result in Romania’s 
withdrawal from its alliance with Germany2 against a country which had taken away 
a big part of our national territory3. 
 In the new political context, the Romanian authorities in Bucharest would 
manage to stand alone and face Germany’s anger; Romanian troops disarmed and 
set free most part of the national territory, including the capital, and paved the way 
for the Soviet Army. As for the significance and the importance of what happened 
on the 23rd of August, it has become clear by now that the act will always be 
interpreted according to the evolution of political events4. 
Nevertheless, the Romanian troops’ volte-face would have unpleasant 
consequences, especially on the front in Moldova. As soon as the Romanian army 
units received an order to cease fire against the Soviet army and they were loose 
from the German troops to withdraw at once to the south of the fortified frontline 
Focşani-Nămoloasa-Brăila5, the commanding officers would obey the Department of 
of Military Structures and cease hostilities against the Red Army, trying to save 
what could still be saved of the Romanian army after the front had been broken by 
the Soviets6.  
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The Soviet commanding structures would make no allowances for this new 
situation, ordering Fronts II and III in Ukraine to continue the offensive against the 
enemy. Thus, a large number of Romanian soldiers who had ceased fire were taken 
prisoners and, strangely enough, they were held prisoners until the 12th of September 
and even afterwards1 . The condition of the officers and crew in the Danube Delta 
and on the Black Sea turned out to be just as disastrous. They were made to cease 
fire on receiving orders from the Romanian authorities and then forced to land and 
confined to Soviet camps. This is how a large part of the Romanian trading ships 
and, of course, the whole of the war fleet was lost to the Soviets2.  
Romanian soldiers would still be captured by Soviet troops even after the truce 
was concluded on the 12th of September; strangely enough, most of them were 
captured in areas where no military operations between Romanian and Soviet forces 
had been carried out, such as Muntenia / Walachia. All these were happening while 
Romanian soldiers had to face German attack, too, for the Germans had received the 
Fuhrer’s command to restore the situation in Romania, which threatened to cause the 
collapse of the entire German military device in the Balkans.  
On the 23rd of August 1944, the Romanian military campaign in the war against 
the Soviets came to an end, not without big casualties as far as the number of 
missing people was concerned, not to mention the material losses in which 
bombardment, the seizure of territories and the military techniques resulted. Since 
1942, Romania was the most important ally of Germany on the East front, as it 
disposed of some 26 Romanian divisions as compared to the eight Italian ones, the 
twelve Hungarian divisions and the varying number of Finnish military units. 
Obviously, among the 46 allied military units that the Germans could dispose of on 
the East front, more than half the number was represented by the Romanian units; as 
a consequence, it was only normal that Romania suffered significant human losses, 
directly proportional to the number of soldiers that had been sent to the front.  
In October 1945, an informative note of the Statistic Service of the Romanian 
army was issued to estimate the total human losses during the campaign in the East 
to 309,503 military men. Mention should be made of the fact that the figures 
referred both to the ones taken prisoners and to those who had died on the 
battlefield, since the Romanian Department of Military Structures did not have the 
means to count the dead and the prisoners separately3.  
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The economic cost of waging war alongside Germany turned out to be of no 
lesser importance; on the 23rd of August, Romanian economy was under the control 
of German capital, as Germany’s debt to the Romanian state went up to some 1.5 
billion deutsche marks. Calling up a significant military contingent was to diminish 
Romania’s capacity for industrial production, whereas the country had to go to great 
lengths to keep the same production rate as before. Moreover, as Romania moved 
towards an economy war, many financial and economic resources which were 
normally meant for various other enterprises were now taken up to keep Romanian 
troops on the front1. Allied bombardments, particularly on the major economic 
centers, will also result in significant losses for Romanian economy; oil industry was 
mainly aimed at, and human losses did not lack in significance. Among indirect 
damage and losses induced upon Romanian economy, mention should be made of 
exchanges which did not amount to Romanian currency as the deutsche mark was 
made to go up artificially as compared to the Romanian leu; thus the price of the 
products imported from Germany went up without any regard for the price of 
Romanian goods for export2; at the same time, the purchasing power of the German 
military increased and they would take certain products off the Romanian market 
only to cause their price to go up artificially. 
The support given to German troops on Romanian territory, the payment system, 
the deductions that resulted from transport and communication were further issues to 
be tackled during collaboration with the Third Reich in the war against the Soviets. 
Whereas German military units and import-export companies purchased essential 
goods at very low prices, the products imported from Germany were of little 
necessity to the Romanian market and they came in at extremely high prices. 
Romania’s complex international position made the country extremely vulnerable 
when confronted with the terms of the German ally which was well aware of the fact 
that Romania could not object under the circumstances. These were some of the 
reasons which cast a shadow on the co-operation between Romania and Germany 
and they were mainly accounted for by the fact that, on accepting to become 
involved in the military campaign on the East front, Romanian authorities had 
overlooked some details, although, legally, Romania’s position was, to a certain 
extent, that of an independent, autonomous state fighting against mutual enemy. 
Obviously, the two armies had not joined forces in response to some military or 
political convention; Romania joined in the war of its own accord with a view to 
setting Basarabia and Bucovina free. 
The events on the 23rd of August were to bring about deep changes, as far as 
Romania’s foreign policy was concerned; all of a sudden, Romania was made to 
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fight - with the same objectives in mind - by the side of its former enemies and 
against its former allies. This sudden turn was sure to serve the cause of the United 
Nations, but Romania would have to pay dearly for it; for a while, Romanian 
authorities and military forces had to resist two enemies and part of the price it had 
to pay was the large number of Romanian soldiers who had been taken prisoners by 
Soviet troops1. 
Despite the significant losses of human lives, war materials and techniques, due 
to cautious course of action taken by the Romanian Department of Military 
Structures, Romania was able to present, on the 23rd of August, five operational 
divisions fully equipped for war and some other 29 divisions consisting mainly of 
recruits and other units which were billeted with the non-mobile troops on the 
battlefield. Romanian military units around the front area were not very well 
organized as they had been destroyed by Soviet offensive, that is why the military 
campaign against Nazi Germany was mainly carried out by these divisions of 
recruits provided inland by the Department of Military Structures. 
The concluding of the Truce Convention by Romania and the United Nations on 
the 12th of September imposed the most significant terms as to how Romania should 
carry out the military campaign against Germany and its allies. The provisions were 
to be brought into operation under the control of an Allied (Soviet) Control 
Commission which, as the three great powers had established, would basically leave 
it to the Soviet Union. The rough interference of the representatives of the 
commission for control was to change the course of home policy and to affect the 
balance of the state budget, as goods were drawn in keeping with the Truce 
Convention. 
Romanian authorities were determined to improve collaboration with the Soviet 
Union as soon as possible and to set Transylvania free, that is why they would send 
to the front more units than the 12 military divisions that the truce asked for, thus 
moving towards applying the economic provisions of the convention. As for the 
number of Romanian military men involved in military operations against German 
troops, it amounted to some 538,536 soldiers out of a total of 1,100,000 who had 
been called up to serve the cause of the United Nations. Between the 23rd of August 
1944 and the 12th of May 1945, Romanian troops had traveled for about 1,700 
kilometers at around 6 kilometers a day, they moved across 12 waterways and 20 
groups of mountains and they took 3,831 villages and towns, among which there 
were 53 big cities. All these were accomplished through the sacrifice made by 
169,822 military men who were killed, injured or declared missing. The strategic, 
material and human support Romania gave to the United Nations was significant 
enough and it helped make the war shorter by some 200 days. 
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Although its support amounted to 1,200,000,000 dollars (1938 currency) and it 
came fourth in the hierarchy of the United Nations that fought against Germany, 
Romania was not granted the status of co-belligerent country which it was entitled 
to. The refusal was based on some political reasons that only the Great Powers knew 
of. Among all the states that had a similar situation, Romania had taken the greatest 
efforts to destroy the Nazi war machine1.  
Despite the fact that it may have varied to some extent in keeping with the 
provisions of the Romanian-Soviet protocol on the 26th of November, the number of 
Romanian troops involved in military operations was always higher than the one 
imposed by the Truce Convention. Moreover, Romania’s contribution hardly knew 
any limits2: both the authorities and the civil population went to great lengths to 
support the military campaign of Romanian troops. No military unit or organization 
carried on the fight against the United Nations after the 23rd of August. For example, 
Italy contributed some 100,000 partisans to the cause of the United Nations, whereas 
5 infantry divisions and 2 air-force squadrons would carry on fighting in the north of 
Italy on Germany’s side. As for Hungary, they came up with 10 divisions, Bulgaria 
– one pro-Nazi division, Yugoslavia - 3 divisions, 9 brigades, a division of guards 
and a regiment of cavalry. In France the number of those who carried on fighting 
soon amounted to the effective force of a quick division, whereas in Poland it 
amounted to some 20-25,000military men3. The statement Romania made at the 
Peace Conference in Paris dwelled on the country’s military and economic direct 
involvement and on the extent to which they had discharged their duties until the 1st 
of July 1945 in keeping with article 3 of the Convention; expenses came to 77 
billion lei (1938 currency. 
The defeat of Nazi Germany saluted by most countries in Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe did not bring about utter joy since the alternative was now the 
communist regime imposed on by the Soviet model. The alternative was rejected by 
most Eastern European societies4 which were still vexed by the war and by the 
release of the Red Army. Hundreds of thousands of people were to fully experience 
the advantages of the Soviet release and the consequences of their countries’ 
political regimes turning into popular regimes under Soviet influence. 
The fact that these popular democratic regimes were forced upon the states in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe would prevent further economic progress of these 
societies; we all had to pay tremendous costs to return to an efficient state, and we 
are still paying them today, more than 50 years after the conflagration. But little 
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mention is made of the moral trouble, the personal failures or the fear in which most 
inhabitants of these countries lived, particularly the war prisoners. They have come a 
long way; they were first regarded as heroes on the battlefield, subsequently they 
were considered traitors to their country, as they were accused of having fought 
against the Soviet Union and of having upset the actual “big brother” that meant to 
control all East-European states and under the influence of which these states would 
embrace communism in their social and political structures. 
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